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INTRODUCTION
Since ancient times property rights have been recognized as an
essential element of a well ordered society. Rejecting Plato's com-
munal designs, Aristode wrote "how immeasurably greater is the
pleasure, when a man feels a thing to be his own."1 When prop-
erty rights are defined, an owner will exercise a careful steward-
ship. When property rights are undefined, however, "there is
much more quarreling among those who have all things in
common."
2
Thomas Aquinas agreed with Aristotle's emphasis on the im-
portance of property.3 Aquinas argued that there are three rea-
sons that property rights are essential. First, they provide impor-
tant incentives for individuals to not "shirk the labour and leave
to another that which concerns the community, as happens
where there is a great number of servants." 4 Second, Aquinas
contended that the clear assignment of responsibility for prop-
erty results in "human affairs [are] conducted in [a] more or-
derly fashion if each man is charged with taking care of some
particular things himself."5 Finally, Aquinas observed that "quar-
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1. ARIsTOTLE, THE PoLrncs 34 (B. Jowett trans., 1885). See also ROB-
ERT H. NEILSON, REACHING FOR HEAVEN ON EARTH: THE THEOLOGICAL
MEANING OF ECONOMICS 36-39 (1991) [hereinafter NELSON, REACHING
FOR HEAVEN]; JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 59
(1954). See generally RICHARD SCHLATrER, PRIVATE PROPERTY: HISTORY OF
AN IDEA (1951).
2. ARISTOTLE, supra note 1, at 35.
3. See NELSON, REACHING FOR HEAVEN, supra note 1, at 42-45;
GEORGE O'BRIEN, AN ESSAY ON MEDIEVAL ECONOMIC TEACHING (1967);
SCHUMPETER, supra note 1, at 92.
4. 10 THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA 224 (Fathers of the En-
glish Dominican Province trans., 1927).
5. Id.
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rels arise more frequently where there is no division of the
things possessed."
6
John Locke affirmed these principles and added that property
rights arise when labor creates something of value from a re-
source.7 No one owns a deer in the wild, but the moment it is
killed, the hunter possesses it.8 In the nineteenth century the
United States would apply a similar concept with the Homestead
Act,9 under which a settler obtained a right to land by its success-
ful farming for five years.10
On the Western federal rangelands, ranchers have grazed pub-
lic lands for a century or more.1 By Locke's standard they are
entitled to the rangelands; yet, many others are entitled to the
land by the same reasoning.1 2 The hunting of deer, antelope, elk
and other animals on public rangelands may have a value equal
to or greater than that of the livestock forage obtained.1 3 If inter-
preted broadly, even those who visit the land to enjoy an evening
6. Id.
7. SeeJoHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 288 (Peter Las-
lett ed., 1988). See generally JOYCE OLDHAM APPLEBY, ECONOMIC THOUGHT
AND IDEOLOGY IN SEVENTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND (1978); C.B. MACPHER-
SON, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES TO
LOCKE (1962).
8. See LOCKE, supra note 7, at 289.
9. See PAUL WALLACE GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEvE-
OPMENT 393-399 (1968). For the history of the public lands in the nine-
teenth century, see BENJAMIN HORACE HIBBARD, A HISTORY OF THE PUB-
Lic LAND POLICES (1965). See generally RoY MARVIN ROBBINS, OUR LANDED
HERITAGE: THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, 1776-1970 (1976).
10. GATES, supra note 9, at 395.
11. DAVID A. ADAMS, RENEWABLE RESOURCE POLICY: THE LEGAL-
INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 90-133 (1993); see also SAMUEL TRASK DANA
& SALLY K FAIRFAX, FOREST AND RANGE POLICY: ITS DEVELOPMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES 86-89 (1980).
12. E. LOUISE PEFFER, THE CLOSING OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: DISPOSAL
AND RESERVATIONS POLICES, 1900-1950, at 311 (1951); see also ROBERT H.
NELSON, PUBLIC LANDS AND PRIVATE RIGHTS: THE FAILURE OF SCIENTIFIC
MANAGEMENT 197-98 (1995) [hereinafter NELSON, PUBLIC LANDS].
13. JERRY L. HOLECHEK ET AL., RANGE MANAGEMENT: PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICES 378-79 (2d ed. 1995); see also COUNCIL ECON. ADVISORS, Eco.
NOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 223 (Feb. 1997).
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sunset may have applied labor to the land to create something of
beauty and value.
In the twentieth century, the solution to multiple claims has
been government ownership of lands throughout the West.1 4 This
solution was readily adopted, under the banner of European so-
cialist, American progressivism and other political and economic
philosophies, as the tides of history shifted once again in this
century towards a much greater role for government.1 5 When
American progressives sought the "scientific management" of so-
ciety, it was easy to explain public land and resource ownership
of as a key part of that design.1 6
Now, however, at the end of the twentieth century, nations are
turning away from past government solutions.1 7 Many govern-
ments are privatizing formerly state owned enterprises.8 On fed-
eral rangelands, potential privatization is complicated by the his-
tory of these lands.19 As noted above, there is already a diversity
14. See PEFFER, supra note 12, at 315-41 (summary of the federal
government's responses to the conflicting claims of stockmen, conserva-
tionists and others through the 1940s).
15. See generally DWIGHT WALDO, THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE: A
STUDY OF THE POLITICAL THEORY OF AMERICAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
(1948); STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EX-
PANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877-1920 (1982).
16. See SAMUEL HAYS, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF EFFICIENCY:
THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATION MOVEMENT, 1890-1920, at 265-66 (1959);
ROBERT NELSON, THE MAKING OF FEDERAL COAL POLICY 15-20 (1983)
[hereinafter NELSON, FEDERAL COAL POLICY]; Randy T. Simmons, The
Progressive Ideal and the Columbia Basin Project, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF THE AMERICAN WEST 95-111 (Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill eds.,
1994); A. Dan Tarlock, The Making of Federal Coal Policy: Lessons for Public
Lands Management from a Failed Program, An Essay and Review, 25 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 349 (1985).
17. See ROBERT W. POOLE, Privatization for Economic Development in
THE PRIVATIZATION PROCESS: A WORLDWIDE PERSPECTIVE 1 (Terry L. An-
derson & Peter J. Hill eds., 1996). See also REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON PRIVATIZATION, PRIVATIZATION: TOWARD MORE EFFECTIVE
GOVERNMENT (March 1988).
18. See POOLE, supra note 17, at 1.
19. Professor Robert Ellickson's argument is as follows:
I urge the Federal Government to consider re-adopting
the nation's land policy of the nineteenth century, a pre-
sumption that federal lands should be transferred to private
6471997]
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of groups and interests with legitimate claims to the land. Priva-
tization in a typical fashion, consisting of the outright sale of the
land by the government, would dispossess these groups of their
claims. This may be economically efficient, but such a scheme
would also be ethically reprehensible, not unlike that of socialist
and other expropriations of private property in the past.2°
Moreover, the evolution of property rights is almost always
gradual and contingent.21 Except in times of revolutionary ex-
cess, it consists of the recognition of the ability of a party to ex-
clude a particular use, to sell access to a resource, and the incre-
mental accumulation of other controls over a resource.22 Such
rights typically evolve informally at first, perhaps grounded in lo-
cal custom. 23 Formal legal acceptance of a right generally occurs
ownership.
Why should the Federal Government still own sixty-one
percent of Idaho and forty-five percent of California? Envi-
ronmentalists should not be blind to the advantages of signif-
icantly reducing these percentages. The privatization of fed-
eral holdings would result in less abuse, such as overgrazing.
Robert Ellickson, Panel I: Liberty, Property and Environmental Ethics 21
ECOLOGY L.Q. 402 (1994). For another proposal to privatize, see Dale A.
Oesterle, Public Land: How Much is Enough? 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 521-75
(1996). For criticisms of public land privatization, see ScoTr LEHMANN,
PRVATIZING PuBLIc LANDS (1995).
20. See Robert H. Nelson, Selling Other People's Property: Why the
Privatization Movement Failed, in NELSON, PUBLIC LANDS, supra note 12, at
183-99.
21. See ARTHUR REED HOGUE, ORIGINS OF THE COMMON LAw 3
(1985); see also John R. Umbeck, Might Makes Rights: A Theory of the For-
mation and Initial Distribution of Property Rights, 19 ECON. INQUIRY 38-59
(1981).
22. This pattern has characterized property rights evolution on
both urban lands and public lands. For a study of the gradual evolu-
tion of property rights to urban lands under zoning, see ROBERT H.
NELSON, ZONING AND PROPERTY RIGHTS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE AMERICAN
SYSTEM OF LAND USE REGULATION (1977) [hereinafter NELSON, ZONING].
23. The uses of land are often determined outside the formal
structures of the law. At some later point, if there is sufficient need,
the law may catch up and formally codify practices long existing. For
an exploration of a network of informal controls over local livestock
grazing, see ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAw: How NEIGH-
BORS SETLE DISPUTES (1991).
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at the end of the process.24
The rights to graze livestock on federal lands come under this
category.25 These de facto rights have existed for a long time,
and many parties informally recognize them, although they are
still officially denied by some. 26 For decades ranchers have
pressed for a more formal establishment of their tenure status
on federal rangelands.27 Today some prominent members of the
environmental movement are reaching similar conclusions. The
delineation of formal rights to use would promote more respon-
sible environmental management and federal rangeland resource
use.n The lack of any clear rights on federal rangelands has re-
sulted in blurred lines of responsibility which have been as harm-
ful to the environment as they have been to the conduct of the
livestock business.29
If rangeland rights were defined and made legally transfer-
rable to any new owner, environmental organizations could
purchase forage rights to federal lands that are now available
only to people engaged in ranching. As owners, such organiza-
24. See FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE LAND LAWS 2-3 (1883).
25. See WALTER P. WEBB, THE GREAT PLAINS 398-431 (1931); Terry L.
Anderson & Peter J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the
American West, 18 J.L. & ECON. 163 (1975). See generally PHILLIP 0. Foss,
POLITICS AND GRASS: THE ADMINISTRATION OF GRAZING ON THE PUBLIC Do-
MAIN (1960).
26. See Foss, supra note 25, at 61-63 (discussing the politics of the
Taylor Grazing Act). See also WAYNE HAGE, STORM OVER THE RANGELANDS:
PRIVATE RIGHTS IN FEDERAL LANDS 3-5 (1989); THE WISE USE AGENDA-
TH-E CrIZEN's POLICY GUIDE TO ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCE ISSUES 14 (A.
Gottlieb ed., 1989).
27. See Foss, supra note 25, at 198.
28. See FRIENDS OF THE EARTH ET AL., GREEN SCISSORS: CUTTING
WASTEFUL AND ENVIRONMENTALLY HARMFUL SPENDING AND SUBSIDIES 23
(Feb. 1996); Karl Hess Jr. & Johanna H. Wald, Grazing Reform: Here's the
Answer, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Oct. 2, 1995, at 14; Andrew Kerr, Remov-
ing Hoofed Locusts from the Public Trough, WILLOWA COUNTY CHIEFTAIN,
Aug. 15, 1996.
29. See JEANNE NIENABER CLARKE & DANIEL C. MCCo0L, STAKING
OUT THE TERRAIN: POWER AND PERFORMANCE AMONG NATURAL RESOURCE
AGENCIES 158-59 (1996); see also BUREAUCRACY VERSUS ENVIRONMENT: THE
ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS OF BUREAUCRATIC GOVERNANCE (John A. Baden &
Richard Stroup eds., 1981).
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tions could ensure that riparian habitat is protected, that forage
is available for wildlife, and that other key environmental objec-
tives are met. Moreover, a clear delineation of rights would en-
courage existing ranchers to invest in the long run improvement
of the land and its productivity. The establishment of forage
rights offers the best means available for resolving the severe
gridlock and polarization that have beset federal rangelands for
the past quarter century or more.
I. AN ENVIRONMENTAL PLAN FOR FEDERAL L4ND FORAGE RIGHTS
Andy Kerr is a fierce partisan of environmental causes.30 As the
chief strategist for the Oregon Natural Resources Coalition, he
sought to sharply curtail, if not eliminate, timber harvesting in
the federal old growth forests of the Pacific Northwest. Now,
Kerr has turned his attention in a new direction arguing that "if
we want - and society does want - to restore streams, bring
back salmon, unendanger species, restore soil productivity and
reduce government spending, then livestock must go from our
public lands."31
Kerr and other environmental activists fought to cut back tim-
ber harvests with the tried-and-true method of the contemporary
environmental movement: by persuading the federal government
to wield a command-and-control stick to compel compliance with
environmental objectives. In the case of the forests of the Pacific
Northwest, Kerr and others tried to use the formidable powers of
the Endangered Species Act to encourage government compli-
ance.3 2 Yet, in seeking to reduce livestock grazing on federal
lands, Kerr now favors a much different approach. Instead of
government coercion, he believes in giving ranchers the right to
sell their access to federal land forage. Environmental and other
organizations could then buy out ranchers in voluntary transac-
tions. In Kerr's words, "a permittee should be able to sell the
30. See ALSTON CHASE, IN A DARK WOOD: THE FIGHT OVER FORESTS
AND THE RISING TYRANNY OF ECOLOGY 181-82 (1995); SusAN ZAKIN,
COYOTES AND TowN DOGS: EARTH FIRST AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVE-
MENT 234-36 (1993).
31. Kerr, supra note 28.
32. See CHASE, supra note 30, at 256-58.
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grazing privilege to anyone: another rancher or to an environ-
mental group who could elect to retire the permit in favor of
salmon and elk or plenty and poetry."
33
Kerr thinks that a buy-out approach would be both "easier"
and "more just" than traditional command-and-control strate-
gies. 34 A buyout approach is more feasible because livestock
ranchers have proven themselves to be powerful political foes.
Persuading the government to exercise its powers to significantly
curtail livestock grazing in areas of special environmental sensitiv-
ity would be a long and difficult political process with uncertain
prospects. Moreover, ranchers have the ability to appeal to pow-
erful images in the average American mind of the lone cowboy
riding the Western range, in a way that no timber harvester ever
could.35
At tfe same time, the federal rangelands have low economic
value in grazing use. It takes at least fifteen acres of standard Bu-
reau of Land Management ("BLM") land to support the grazing
of one cow (and often a calf) for one month. 36 As shown by mar-
ket trades that have long occurred among ranchers, it would re-
quire an average of only about $2.50 to $2.60 per acre to buy out
a BLM grazing permit.37 At these prices, many environmental
groups have sufficient resources to buy out rancher permits cov-
33. Kerr, supra note 28.
34. Id.
35. See Donald Snow, The Pristine Silence of Leaving It All Alone, in A
WOLF IN THE GARDEN: THE LAND RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND THE NEW ENvI-
RONMENTAL DEBATE 29-30 (Philip D. Brick & R. McGreggor Cawley eds.,
1996).
36. There are about 9.7 million animal unit months (AUMs) of
grazing on about 150 million total acres of BLM grazing land, thus
averaging about 15 acres per AUM. See BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., U.S.
DEP'T INTERIOR, PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS 1993, at 23-25 (1994) [hereinaf-
ter PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS 1993].
37. Average 1992 permit values for an AUM of grazing ranged
from $36 in Wyoming to $89 per AUM in New Mexico (for about 15
acres per AUM on average). See L. Allen Torrell et al., The Market Value
of Public Land Forage Implied from Grazing Permits, in CURRENT ISSUES IN
RANGELAND ECONOMICS - 1994, at 80 (Neil R. Rimbey & Diane E. Isaak
eds., 1994). The typical purchase price for a BLM permit thus is about
$2.50 to $6.00 per acre.
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ering significant acreages of federal grazing lands, including the
lands of most environmental interest.3"
Today, livestock grazing takes place on approximately 260 mil-
lion acres of federal forests and rangelands. 39 It is not necessary
for any environmental purpose to buy out all of this grazing
land?° Indeed, in many areas, livestock grazing may be necessary
to improve rangeland conditions. 4' Nevertheless, assuming that
environmentalists did want to buy out all grazing rights and that
ranchers were willing to sell, a maximum estimate of cost would
be $2 billion for BLM and Forest Service lands.42
Besides purchases by environmental groups, the government
could also enter the market for grazing rights in selected areas.
Environmental activists oppose grazing in wilderness areas and
have sought to have the government remove livestock from these
and other areas.43 Negotiated purchases from rancher sellers
38. See DONALD SNOW, CONSERVATION FUND, INSIDE THE ENVIRONMEN-
TAL MOVEMENT: MEETING THE LEADERSHIP CHALLENGE xvii (1992). The
major environmental organizations typically each have budgets in the
tens of millions of dollars. See JONATHAN H. ADLER, ENVIRONMENTALISM
AT THE CROSSROADS: GREEN ACTIVISM IN AMERICA, apps. I-XXI (1995).
39. See BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., U.S. DEP'T INTERIOR, GRAzING FEE
REVIEW AND EVALUATION: UPDATE OF THE 1986 FINAL REPORT 69 (1992)
[hereinafter GRAZING FEE REVIEW].
40. See Jerry L. Holechek, Policy Changes on Federal Rangelands: A
Perspective, J. WATER & SOIL CONSERVATION, May-June 1993, at 171-72
(1993).
41. See HOLECHEK ET AL., supra note 13, at 127-29.
42. Total BLM grazing in 1993 was 9.7 million AUMs. See PUBLIC
LAND STATISTICS 1993, supra note 36, at 24-25. Total Forest Service graz-
ing in 1993 was 8.4 million AUMs. See FOREST SERV., DEP'T AGRIC., RE-
PORT OF THE FOREST SERVICE, FISCAL YEAR 1993, at 142 (May 1994). A
maximum estimate for the purchase price of an AUM, based on prices
in recent years, is $100. See Torrell et al., supra note 37, at 80. Thus, for
total BLM and Forest Service AUMs, an estimate of the maximum
purchase cost at market value is $1.81 billion, or allowing some further
margin for error, $2 billion.
43. In the early 1990s, many environmentalists adopted the slogan,
"cattle free by '93," for the federal rangelands. See K.L. Cool, Seeking
Common Ground on Western Rangelands 14 RANGELANDS 90-92 (1992). A
classic statement of environmental opposition to livestock grazing is
found in Edward Abbey, Even the Bad Guys Wear White Hats: Cowboys,
Ranchers and the Ruin of the West HARPER'S, Jan. 1986, at 51-55.
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would be a fairer, less confrontational, and more politically feasi-
ble way to accomplish this.
The costs of administering grazing on BLM lands are esti-
mated to be about $200 million per year.44 The degree of ineffi-
ciency is demonstrated by the fact that it would require two to
five years of BLM administrative costs to pay the full value for all
current livestock grazing on BLM lands.45 As long as administra-
tive costs are so high, it would pay to abolish the existing grazing
regime and buy out all grazing rights. Kerr argues that "since the
government spends $10 for every $1 it takes in on grazing, in a
few years the [administrative] savings can pay for the compensa-
tion [paid to buy out ranchers]. Then the money could go to
debt payments or starving kids or heart bypasses." 46 Although it
is impossible to defend the status quo, other strategies for
change might be adopted, including drastic reductions in gov-
ernment administrative costs.
Departing from the longstanding environmental conventional
wisdom, it is fairer and more equitable to pay the rancher.47
Many ranchers have grazed the same federal lands for a century
or more, building expectations of continued federal land access
into their private ranching investments and other calculations.
When a ranch has been sold, the permit to graze on the con-
44. In 1981, the full costs (including overhead) of managing BLM
grazing were $125 million. See ROBERT H. NELSON & GABRIEL JOSEPH,
OFF. POL'Y ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP'T INTERIOR, AN ANALYSIS OF REVENUES AND
COSTS OF PUBLIC LAND MANAGEMENT BY THE INTERIOR DEPARTMENT IN 13
WESTERN STATES - UPDATE TO 1981 (Sept. 1982). Assuming that graz-
ing continued to represent the same proportion of the BLM budget,
and adjusting for the increase in the BLM budget from 1981 to 1992,
the estimated 1992 cost of BLM grazing management was $193 million,
or about $200 million, in 1995. See ROBERT H. NELSON, How AND WHY
TO TRANSFER BLM LANDS TO THE STATES 10 (Competitive Enterprise
Inst., Jan. 1996) [hereinafter NELSON, How AND WHY].
45. Grazing takes place on about 150 million acres of BLM lands.
See PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS 1993, supra note 36, at 23. The typical
purchase cost of a BLM grazing permit is about $2.50 to $6 per acre.
See supra note 37. Thus, the estimated total purchase cost for all BLM
permits is $400 to $900 million, or about two to five years at $200 mil-
lion per year in administrative cost savings.
46. Kerr, supra note 28.
47. Id.
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nected federal land, which by long practice automatically accom-
panies the transfer of ranch ownership, often represents a major
portion of the private ranch value. 48 Thus, many purchasers of
ranches have in effect paid for their grazing access to federal
lands. As Kerr comments, "the market recognizes the value of
the permits when ranches are transferred. Grazing reductions re-
duce the value of the [private] property to which the permits are
attached."49 So, Kerr concludes, it is only fair that the govern-
ment should compensate the rancher for this loss of value.
As Kerr describes his plan, it is "a solution to an environmen-
tal problem that requires less government regulation and lets the
free market work. Call it supply-side ecology. "50
II. RETHINKING THE FEDERAL RANGELANDS
One need not fully agree with Kerr's assessment of the envi-
ronmental impacts of livestock grazing, or believe that grazing
needs to be curtailed on all western lands, to recognize that, if it
were to be adopted, the marketing of grazing forage rights to
nonranchers would be a milestone in the history of federal land
policy.
In the past, the government has sought to resolve issues such
as the role of livestock grazing on government lands through
"scientific" debate about the ecological, economic and other im-
pacts of grazing."1 The potential values of competing uses must
also be factored in and weighed against the grazing value. 52 The
48. See B. Delworth Gardner, Transfer Restrictions and Misallocation
in Grazing Public Range, 44 J. FARM ECON. 52 (1962). See also B. Delworth
Gardner, The Role of Economic Analysis in Public Range Management [here-
inafter Gardner, Role of Economic Analysis], in NAT'L RES. COUNCiL/NAT'L
ACAD. Sci., DEVELOPING STRATEGIES FOR RANGELAND MANAGEMENT: A RE-
PORT PREPARED BY THE COMMITTEE ON DEVELOPING STRATEGIES FOR RANGE-
LAND MANAGEMENT 1452 (1984) [hereinafter DEVELOPING STRATEGIES].
49. Kerr, supra note 28.
50. Id.
51. See KARL HESS, VISIONS UPON THE LAND: MAN AND NATURE ON
THE WESTERN RANGE 80 (1992); Sally K. Fairfax, Coming of Age in the Bu-
reau of Land Management: Range Management in Search of a Gospel in DE-
VELOPING STRATEGIES, supra note 48, at 1738-40.
52. See PUB. LAND L. REV. COMM'N, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S
LAND: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS 45-47 (1970);
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existing federal land system has set levels and seasons of livestock
grazing by planning grounded in scientific determinations.5 3 It
has all been part of the scientific management philosophy that
has provided the intellectual foundation for federal land man-
agement since the progressive era early in this century.54
Now, however, Kerr and others seek to bypass much of that.
The question of whether federal land forage should be used for
grazing would no longer be resolved by government planners but
by the competitive workings of the marketplace, as already oc-
curs on private lands in the West. It would be a question of
whether environmentalists, recreationists, or other groups are
willing to meet the rancher's selling price. The precise motives
or scientific calculations of either party would be irrelevant. Such
an approach would involve less conflict than the existing regula-
tory regime because changes in rangeland use would be achieved
through voluntary transactions. It would also require much less
involvement by government administrative officers, offering ma-
jor potential savings in government expenditures.
Kerr is not the only prominent environmentalist these days
talking about creating forage markets on federal lands. Johanna
Wald has been the leading environmental spokesperson on mat-
ters relating to livestock grazing on federal lands for years. In
1974, as an attorney for the Natural Resource Defense Council
(where she remains today), Wald was instrumental in winning
NRDC v. Morton in federal court.5 As a result of this decision,
the Bureau of Land Management was required to prepare almost
150 new land use plans. These proposals reexamined the role of
livestock grazing on 170 million acres of federal land, an effort
that absorbed large amounts of agency attention and money over
13 years.56 However, the BLM ended up spending a great deal
Perry R. Hagenstein, The Federal Lands Today - Uses and Limits, in RE-
THINKING THE FEDERAL LANDS 74, 92-93 (Sterling Brubaker ed., 1984);
JAMES MUHN & HANSON R. STUART, OPPORTUNITY AND CHALLENGE: THE
STORY OF BLM 104-06 (1988).
53. See Fairfax, supra note 51, at 1739.
54. See HAYS, supra note 16, at 265-66.
55. Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) v. Morton, 388 F.
Supp. 829, 840 (D.C. 1974), aff', 527 F.2d 1386 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
56. See R MCGREGGOR CAWLEY, FEDERAL LANDS, WESTERN ANGER:
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but making few changes in grazing practices. Partly out of disillu-
sionment with that long planning process, Wald has recently sug-
gested that it may be necessary to turn to the market.
5 7
Writing in the High Country News (with Karl Hess) in the fall of
1995, Wald called for a new approach to federal land grazing
based on "incentives and markets. '5 8 Environmentalists and
others "should be free to acquire permits to federal grass and to
use the lands to enhance wildlife, stabilize soils, protect endan-
gered species, improve riparian areas or, if they prefer, raise red
meat."5 9 If the law were to allow this, environmentalists would
"have less cause to push for a political end to grazing on ecologi-
cally fragile public lands. For the first time, they will have market
options, like buying all or a portion of a rancher's permit or sim-
ply leasing federal forage." 6°
One might think that Dave Foreman, the founder of the radi-
cal environmental group Earth First, would be unlikely to favor
linking free markets with environmental objectives. 61 In the 1980s
Foreman was willing to break the law, advocating the
"monkeywrenching" of timber harvesting and other machinery,
to gain his objectives. 62 Solutions grounded in the recognition of
private rights were far from his thinking. Yet, recently Foreman
has stated that he has had a change of heart. He now proposes
an effort to "buy out grazing permittees in Wilderness Areas, Na-
tional Parks, Wildlife Refuges, and other reserves. The butting-
head battles with ranchers over grazing in Wilderness is bad
news for all involved. The most practical and fairest way to end
grazing in Wilderness is to buy 'em out," instead of forcing its
removal.63
Some environmental groups have invested in this approach. In
1995 an environmental organization, Forest Guardians, bid to
THE SAGEBRUSH REBELLION AND ENVIRONMENTAL PoLrncs 50 (1993).
57. See Hess & Wald, supra note 28.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See DAVE FOREMAN, CONFESSIONS OF AN EcO-WARRIOR 18 (1991).
62. Id. at 117.
63. Dave Foreman, Around the Campfire, WILD EARTH, Fall 1995, at
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lease grazing lands owned by the state of New Mexico. 64 Unlike
the federal government, most states regularly put their grazing
lands up for auction. New Mexico State Lands Commissioner,
Ray Powell, initially refused bids for nongrazing uses. Facing
growing environmental protests and threats of legal action for
failure to exercise a proper trust responsibility (state trust lands
are to be managed to raise revenues for schools and other state
purposes), Powell altered his stance. In October 1996, the Forest
Guardians entered a bid for a New Mexico grazing lease includ-
ing an environmentally sensitive riparian area along the Rio Pu-
erco River, and the state accepted the bid. This was the first time
an environmental group has purchased grazing rights in a state
competitive lease sale.65
Local governments in the Las Vegas area have paid more than
$1 million to purchase five federal grazing allotments, water
rights, range improvements, and the base property from existing
ranchers, involving more than 900,000 acres. 6 This purchase was
intended to eliminate grazing over the allotments, a key part of a
broader agreement between the local governments and the Fish
and Wildlife Service to implement a habitat conservation plan
for the desert tortoise, which is listed under the Endangered
Species Act.67 Rather than forcibly removing the ranchers, which
might have been possible under existing law, the Las Vegas plan
paid compensation through a voluntary buyout of the affected
parties. This approach should be extended to resolve other en-
dangered species conflicts. The plan also provides for spending
an additional $1 million in order to "purchase [further] grazing
privileges from willing sellers." 68
In September 1996 the Nature Conservancy of Utah an-
nounced that it had obtained an option, and planned later to
purchase for $4.6 million, the Dugout ranch at the entrance to
64. See Katie Fesus, New Mexico Environmentalists Lease State Lands,
HIGH CourTRY NEWS, Nov. 25, 1996, at 4.
65. See id.
66. See Clark County (Nev.) Desert Conservation Plan 82 (Aug.
1995) [hereinafter Desert Conservation Plan].
67. See id.
68. Id. at 94.
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the Needles District of Canyonlands National Park. 69 The
purchase covered 5,167 acres of private property and associated
control over the grazing use of 250,000 acres of BLM and Forest
Service allotments. 70 The Nature Conservancy plans to continue
the livestock business, while taking steps to ensure that the pres-
ence of cattle is compatible with the high biodiversity, scenic and
other environmental assets of the allotments. The purchase was
partly designed to prevent the sale of the private lands for sec-
ond homes and other developments.
Dave Livermore, the Utah State Director for Nature Conser-
vancy, commented that the organization increasingly sought to
move "beyond the rangeland conflict" and enter into "collabora-
tive efforts with livestock operators." 71 For one thing, "cows are
better than condos. Increasingly in the West, this is the only
choice we face." 72 Moreover, "for biodiversity to be preserved, lo-
cal people must prosper... We have to offer models which, by
embracing progressive grazing practices, also make economic
sense."73 In the Dugout ranch case, the Nature Conservancy con-
cluded that a direct purchase was the best route, but in other
cases subleasing, purchase of easements, and other transactions
might be appropriate.
This shift in strategy by some environmentalists is long over-
due. In Sand County Almanac, Aldo Leopold argued that funda-
mental environmental improvements would only come about
when people changed their thinking.74 Government could be
useful, but at some point it would become a "mastodon .. .
handicapped by its own dimensions. '' 75 If government asks a
property owner to "perform some unprofitable act for the good
of the community," costing the owner directly, it would only be
69. See Option Signed To Protect Dugout Ranch, BASIN, RANGE & RIM.
ROCK (Nature Conservancy of Utah), Fall 1996, at 1.
70. See id.
71. Dave Livermore, Director's Report: Cows vs. Condos, BASIN, RANGE
& RIMROCK (Nature Conservancy of Utah), Fall 1996, at 2.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. ALDo LEOPOLD, A SAND CouNTY ALMANAC 228 (1949).
75. Id. at 250.
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"fair and proper" to pay for this.76 Leopold also suggests that, if
livestock must be excluded from certain areas to protect the griz-
zly bears, then "buying out scattered livestock ranches is the only
way to create such areas. " 77
In the long run, "the answer, if there is any, seems to be in a
land ethic, or some other force which assigns more obligation to
the private land owner. '78 In short, if the land owner, or the
grazer on the public rangelands, is to behave according to a land
ethic, it will not result from government compulsion but from
that person's freedom to experiment and manage the land in ac-
cordance with his or her own vision of what is ethical. That re-
quires personal independence and the ability to control use that
only a private ownership regime can offer.
III. THE EXISTING GRAZING SYSTEM
Establishing a new rights regime for federal forests and range-
lands would help resolve the most controversial and bitterly
fought issue in federal lands history. Fierce disputes over live-
stock grazing date back to the late nineteenth century.79 Until
then, the settlement of the United States' western territories had
taken place only where there was enough rain for crop farming.
But when settlement moved beyond the 100th meridian (going
westward, approximately one-half of the way through the
Dakotas, Nebraska and Kansas), there was no longer sufficient
moisture for traditional farming.80 Absent irrigation, the only fea-
sible agricultural use of the land was grazing.81
The principal law for the disposal of federal land was the
Homestead Act of 1862,82 enabling a settler who farmed 160
acres for five years to acquire free ownership. This worked well
in the Midwest, but it was ill suited to the arid grazing lands fur-
76. Id.
77. Id. at 277.
78. Id. at 250.
79. See Foss, supra note 25, at 28-36.
80. See WALLACE STEGNER, BEYOND THE HUNDREDTH MERIDIAN: JOHN
WESLEY POWELL AND THE SECOND OPENING OF THE WEST 214 (1954).
81. See PEFFER, supra note 12, at 13, 23; see also HEss, supra note 51,
at 68.
82. Law of May 20, 1862, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392 (repealed 1976).
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ther west.8 3 On these lands, the productivity of the land was so
low that a small family ranch of 50 head of cattle often required
more than 5,000 acres for grazing." In the most arid lands, such
as were found over parts of New Mexico and Arizona, such a
ranch might require considerably more acreage.
Congress refused to modify the Homestead Act, however, and
other public land laws with similar acreage limits, for many
years, 8 partly because by eastern standards owning thousands of
acres seemed a virtual landed estate.86 Others hoped, against all
evidence, that small family farms growing crops on the Midwest
model would eventually extend all over the West.87
The Homestead Act itself formally codified practices that had
developed over a long history of squatters' rights on public
lands.88 From the early settlement days, when the government
did not make land available at times and under acceptable
terms, settlers simply defied the law and moved onto the land. At
some point what began as an unlawful occupancy was recognized
by Congress in an ownership grant.8 9
In the late nineteenth century, when the Homestead Act
proved unsuited to their circumstances, ranchers also followed
the practices of the early settlers. They installed barbed wire
fences over portions of the public rangelands to stake out "their"
rangeland. 9° This time, however, the federal government refused
to recognize the squatters' actions.91 The government was not
prepared to convey large acreages for such a low value land use
83. See WALTER P. WEBB, THE GREAT PLAINS 411-12 (1981).
84. Typical Bureau of Land Management rangeland requires about
15 acres per animal unit month (AUM). See supra note 36. If they en-
gaged in grazing for two thirds of the year (perhaps being fed hay in
the winter), a ranch of 50 cattle might require 800 AUMs of grazing,
requiring an area of 6,000 acres of rangeland.
85. See PEFFER, supra note 12, at 13.
86. See WEBB, supra note 82, at 408-09.
87. See HESS, supra note 51, at 67.
88. See GATES, supra note 9, at 387.
89. See id. at 222-23.
90. See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND,
WATER AND THE FUTURE OF THE WEST 86-87 (1992).
91. See GATES, supra note 9, at 466-68.
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as livestock grazingY2
Therefore, ranchers turned to other ways of asserting control
over the public range. 93 They recognized that uncontrolled com-
mons prove disastrous for range conditions. 4 Using the Home-
stead Act and other existing legislation, ranchers acquired pri-
vate ownership of key properties controlling access to the nearby
public range.95 Such property might then be used to control ac-
cess to public grazing lands through a canyon or it might con-
tain a spring with the area's only available water. A rancher
might obtain land along a river or stream to irrigate lands and
grow hay for winter feed supplies, a ranching necessity in north-
ern climates. Ranchers also arranged among themselves for indi-
vidual access to the federal rangeland in particular areas.96
All this created a de facto division of range rights among com-
peting livestock users.Y However, the periodic eruption of range
wars involving cattlemen, sheep herders and homesteaders testi-
fied to the instability and unsatisfactory nature of these efforts to
deal with a classic commons situation.9
Following the enactment of the Forest Reserve Act of 1891,99
existing allocations of federal land grazing were given a more se-
cure legal status in the national forest system. 1°° Under the Act,
exclusive permits were issued to ranchers for grazing in certain
areas.10 1 Then, grazing on the remaining public domain lands
was brought under government control by the Taylor Grazing
92. See id.
93. See WILKINSON, supra note 90, at 88-89.
94. See HESS, supra note 51, at 61-64; see also Hardin, The Tragedy of
the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243-48 (1968).
95. See WILKINSON, supra note 90, at 83.
96. See GARY D. LIBECAP, LOCKING UP THE RANGE: FEDERAL LAND
CoNTRO.Ls AND GRAZING 15-23 (1981).
97. See id. at 15.
98. See WILKINSON, supra note 90, at 85-86; see also Foss, supra note
25, at 30-32.
99. Law of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 561, 26 Stat. 1095 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C. and 43 U.S.C.).
100. See id. § 8 (current version at 16 U.S.C. §§ 608-611a).
101. See ADAMS, supra note 11, at 92-94; see also DANA & FAIRFAX,
supra note 11, at 88-89.
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Act of 1934.101 Under the Act, ranchers were eligible to graze on
federal lands if they met two conditions: (1) ownership of nearby
private "base" ranch property that was complementary with live-
stock grazing on federal lands, and (2) demonstration of a re-
cent history of grazing on federal rangelands. 1 3 The practical ef-
fect was to give force of law to existing informal grazing
arrangements.1 The one major exception - an important rea-
son many cattlemen favored the law - was that it excluded the
migratory sheep herders who had never been part of the local
range allocation system.10 5
The Taylor Grazing Act was a kind of retroactive homestead
act for federal rangelands. A new agency, the Grazing Service,
was created to administer the new system of rangeland alloca-
tions °6 In 1946, the Grazing Service was merged with the old
General Land Office, whose mission was greatly reduced once
the disposal era had ended, thereby creating the current Bureau
of Land Management ("BLM"). 10 7 The BLM was originally
formed to police the grazing arrangements established by the
Taylor Grazing Act.'08 Livestock grazing still accounts for a major
portion of the time and effort of BLM personnel. The BLM cur-
rently has a total budget of about $600 million per year for the
management of all types of lands and resources, °9 an estimated
28 percent of which is attributable to the existence of the graz-
ing program.110
102. Law of June 28, 1934, ch. 865, 48 Stat. 1269 (current version
at 43 U.S.C. §§ 315 to 315o-1); see Foss, supra note 25, at 59.
103. See 43 U.S.C. § 315; see also Foss, supra note 25, at 62-63.
104. See Foss, supra note 25, at 70-71; see also WESLEY CARR CALEF,
PRIVATE GRAZING AND PUBLIC LANDS: STUDIES OF THE LAND MANAGEMENT
OF THE TAYLOR GRAzING Acr (1960).
105. See Foss, supra note 25, at 72.
106. See MuHN & STUART, supra note 52, at 37-41.
107. See id. at 4849; MARION CLAWSON, THE BUREAU OF LAND MAN-
AGEMENT 31 (1971).
108. See Robert H. Nelson, The Federal Land Management Agencies, in
A NEW CENTURY FOR NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 52 (Richard L.
Knight & Sarah F Bates eds., 1995).
109. See BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR
1998, Appendix, at 549 (1997).
110. See NELSON, How AND WHY, supra note 44, at 11.
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Under the provisions of the Taylor Grazing Act affecting BLM
lands, each eligible rancher is permitted to graze cattle (or
sheep) on a designated portion of federal land, called an "allot-
ment.""' Most ranchers are the sole grazing users of this land
area, although some graze their livestock together with other
ranchers in common allotments. The BLM may grant the
rancher up to a ten year permit to use the allotment.112 Although
not explicitly required by law, the BLM and Forest Service have
almost always renewed the existing rancher's permit.13 When the
"base" ranch to which the permit is attached has been sold, the
BLM has almost always transferred the permit to the new owner,
although the agency is not legally required to do so.n4
As a result, the assurance of future access to federal lands con-
nected to a particular private ranch property has taken on the
character of a property right. This right has "permit value,"
which often represents a significant portion of the ranch's total
value. 115 The public land agencies insist that the rancher does
not have an actual property right,1 6 but at the same time the
levels of federal capital gains and estate tax calculations reflect
the permit value.1 7 Banks collateralize loans to ranchers on the
basis of ranch values partly attributable to permit value." 8
The rancher's permit specifies how many livestock are allowed
to graze the allotment and the precise times the livestock can be
on the federal rangeland. For example, a rancher in a northern
state might have a permit to graze 200 head of cattle on a partic-
111. Law: Public Grazing Laws and Regulations, DIFFERENT DRUMMER,
Spring 1994, at 21 [hereinafter Public Grazing Laws].
112. See Karl Hess Jr. & Jerry L. Holechek, Beyond the Grazing Fee:
An Agenda for Rangeland Reform, POL'Y ANALYSIS (Cato Inst.), July 13,
1995, at 13.
113. See PUB. LAND L. REv. COMM'N, supra note 52, at 109.
114. See id. at 118.
115. See Gardner, Role of Economic Analysis, supra note 48, at 59-61.
116. See BuREAu LAND MGMT., U.S. DEP'T INTERIOR, RANGELAND RE-
FORM '94: DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 3-71 (1994) [herein-
after RANGELAND REFORM '94]; see also DANA & FAIRFAX, supra note 11, at
89.
117. See L. Allen Torell & John P. Doll, Public Land Policy and the
Value of Grazing Permits, 16 W. J. AGRIC. ECON. 174-84 (1991).
118. See PUB. LAND L. REV. COMM'N, supra note 52, at 118.
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ular allotment of BLM land between June 1 and July 15.119 After
that, the cattle might move for several months to a higher eleva-
tion on Forest Service lands, perhaps returning to the BLM lands
for a portion of the fall. In the winter, the rancher may feed the
cattle from his private lands, including hay grown during the
summer and stored for that purpose. In the warmer southwest, it
is common for a rancher to keep livestock on BLM and/or For-
est Service land for the entire year, known as "yearlong
grazing" 120
A person must be a livestock operator to hold a permit for for-
age in a federal land allotment. This requirement partly reflects
the need for the permit holder to own a base private ranch
property.121 More fundamentally, the federal lands grazing sys-
tem, similar to western water law, follows a use-it-or-lose-it philos-
ophy.122 If a rancher does not use the allotment for livestock
grazing, the government considers the rancher to be in violation
of the provisions of the Taylor Grazing Act and will reallocate
the permit to another livestock operator. This feature of the sys-
tem has prevented hunting, fishing, environmental and other
nonranching groups from bidding to purchase grazing permits
from ranchers and then dedicating the forage to some other
type of nongrazing use.
One of the major sources of grazing conflict has been the
grazing fee. The Forest Service began charging a fee in 1906. In
1934, the Taylor Act authorized a fee on BLM lands.1 3 The fee is
charged based on the number of months that each cow (some-
times with a calf) or other domestic animal spends grazing on
public rangelands - the "animal unit months" ("AUMs"). In
1993, there were 9.7 million AUMs of livestock grazing on BLM
lands and 8.4 million AUMs on Forest Service lands.124 The 1993
grazing fee was $1.86 per AUM.1 25 Thus, total government graz-
119. See HOLECHEK ET AL., supra note 13, at 227.
120. Id. at 228, 231-32.
121. See Public Grazing Laws, supra note 111, at 21.
122. See id. at 44.
123. See 43 U.S.C. § 315b; see also GRAZING FEE REVIEw, supra note
39, at 65.
124. See supra note 42.
125. See PUBuC LAND STATISTICs 1993, supra note 36, at 23.
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ing revenues for BLM and Forest Service lands were less than
$35 million. This small amount of money was the government's
main source of revenue from surface lands extending over more
than 10 percent of the land area of the United States. This fig-
ure reflected the low economic value of the grazing activity.
Since the 1970s, environmental groups have sought greater
recognition of wildlife, watershed, and other nonranching uses
of the public rangelands. 126 In order to accommodate these uses,
these groups have pressured federal land agencies to make re-
ductions in livestock grazing. In the mid-1970s, the Natural Re-
source Defense Council won a major court case requiring BLM
to undertake a brand new round of land use planning. 27 The
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 gave a Con-
gressional blessing to this effort, mandating that land use plans
form the basis of BLM's future management actions.lu Yet, land
use planning has more often yielded gridlock and polarization
than decisive and effective management. 12 9 A top BLM official
126. See CAWlEY, supra note 56, at 48-53; C. BRACT SHORT, RONALD
REAGAN AND THE PUBLIC LANDS: AMERICA'S CONSERVATION DEBATE, 1979-
1984 12 (1989); D. Michael Harvey, Public Land Politics in the 1980s, in
PUBLIC LANDS AND THE U.S. ECONOMY: BALANCING CONSERVATION AND DE.
VELOPMENT 86-87 (George M. Johnston & Peter M. Emerson ed., 1984).
127. NRDC v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829 (D.D.C. 1974).
128. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-84 (1994). Language in FLPMA directs that
"The Secretary shall ... develop, maintain, and, when appropriate, re-
vise land use plans which provide by tracts or areas for the use of the
public lands." 43 U.S.C. § 1712. For a comprehensive treatment of
FLPMA and other aspects of the legal regime for the management of
BLM lands, see George C. Coggins et al., The Law of Public Rangeland
Management I: The Extent and Distribution of Federal Power, 12 ENVTL. L.
535 (1982); George C. Coggins & Margaret Lindeberg-Johnson, The
Law of Public Rangeland Management II: The Commons and the Taylor Act,
13 ENvm. L. 1 (1982); George C. Coggins, The Law of Public Rangeland
Management III: A Survey of Creeping Regulation at the Periphery, 1934-1982,
13 ENrrL. L. 295 (1983); George C. Coggins, The Law of Public Range-
land Management IV- FLPMA, PRA, and the Multiple Use Mandate, 14
ENVTL. L. 1 (1983); George C. Coggins, The Law of Public Rangeland
Management V: Prescriptions for Reform, 14 ENvrL. L. 497 (1984).
129. Discussing the land use planning and other decision making
procedures set in place in the 1970s, Frank Gregg (former Director of
the BLM in the Carter Administration) recently observed that "we have
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commented at a 1994 public land conference, "we recognize that
our planning systems have been a pretty bad failure."13°
More powerful pressure for change in livestock grazing prac-
tices may come from the budget plan. The BLM lands' main out-
puts are livestock grazing, recreation, wildlife, timber harvests,
energy minerals, and "hardrock" minerals.1 31 If all BLM costs are
assigned to one particular type of output factoring in overhead
costs as well, the management costs for livestock grazing are esti-
mated at $200 million.1 32 Yet, government revenues earned from
livestock grazing on BLM lands in 1993 yielded less than $20
million.1 33
The federal grazing fee may not reflect grazing activity's true
market value; however, even using government estimates, the to-
tal economic value of livestock grazing on BLM land is below $70
million, about one third of the administrative cost 34 By any ac-
cepted economic and budgetary criteria, there are strong incen-
tives to search for alternatives to the current livestock grazing
system.135
now amassed a considerable history in participating in and judging the
revised system, and we agree that we are in another generation of dis-
satisfaction. We have characterized the present as gridlock, polarization,
so extreme as to suggest extraordinary urgency in pondering what
needs to be done." Frank Gregg, Summary, in MULTIPLE USE AND SUS-
TAINED YIELD: CHANGING PHILOSOPHIES FOR FEDERAL LAND MANAGEMENT
311 (Committee Print No. 11, Comm. Interior & Insular Aff., U.S.
House of Representatives, 1992).
130. Mike Penfold, Remarks at the Second Annual Western Public
Lands Conference on "Who Governs the Public Lands: Washington?
The West? The Community?," Sch. L., Univ. Colo., Boulder, Colo.
(Sept. 28, 1994).
131. See NELSON, How AND WHY, supra note 44, at 11.
132. See supra note 44.
133. See PUBLIC LAND STATiSTiCS 1993, supra note 36, at 23.
134. The government estimate of the market value of federal land
grazing is $6.53 per AUM. See GRAZING FEE REVIEW, supra note 39, at 14.
There are about 10 million AUMs of grazing on BLM land. See PUBLIC
LAND STATISTICS 1993, supra note 36, at 24-25.
135. See Oesterle, supra note 19, at 530-31. See also Robert H. Nel-
son, Economic Issues in the Multiple-Use Management of Public
Rangeland, paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Western Ec-
onomic Association, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, July 9-12, 1989, reprinted in
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Any significant changes would affect the lives of many ranch-
ers. The federal grazing system presently serves about 17,800 live-
stock operators on BLM lands and 9,100 on Forest Service
lands. 13 6 The size of allotments ranges from less than 40 acres to
more than 1,000,000 acres. 3 7 The forage obtained from federal
lands supplies about seven percent of the total rangeland forage
consumed in the United States and two percent of the total feed
consumed by cattle.138 Although federal forage does not contrib-
ute much to the national feed supply for livestock, it does play a
significant role in the Western ranching industry. In Idaho 88
percent of cattle spend part of the year grazing on federal range-
lands; in Wyoming the figure is 64 percent; and in Arizona 63
percent. 39
IV. A BRIEF HISTORY OF FORAGE RIGHTS
Although environmentalists such as Andy Kerr have recently
proposed buying out the grazing permits of ranchers who are
willing to sell, this idea has existed for many years. 4° The origi-
nal proponents were economists concerned with the economic
problems associated with the process of allocating access to graz-
ing on government-owned lands. Although ranchers face little
risk of being displaced altogether from allotments, the terms of
their status on the rangelands are subject to the winds of politi-
cal change and lack security. Economists have long recognized
WESTERN ECONOMIc ASSOCIATION, PAPERS OF THE 1989 ANNuAL MEETING,
Western Economic Ass'n (1989).
136. See GRAZING FEE REviEw, supra note 39, at 4.
137. Donald D. Waite, Economic Efficiency and Equity Issues in
Federal Land Grazing 1 (Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the
Eastern Economic Association, April 1986).
138. See GRAZING FEE REVIEW, supra note 39, at 2.
139. See id. at 3.
140. See B. Delworth Gardner, A Proposal to Reduce Misallocation of
Livestock Grazing Permits, 45 J. FARM ECON. 109, 115-17 (1963) [hereinaf-
ter Gardner, Grazing Permits]; see also Gardner, Role of Economic Analysis,
supra note 48, at 1453-54; William E. Martin, Mitigating the Economic Im-
pacts of Agency Programs for Public Rangelands, in DEVELOPING STRATEGIES,
supra note 48, at 1677-78; Robert H. Nelson, Private Rights to Government
Actions: How Modern Property Rights Evolve 1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 361 (1986)
[hereinafter Nelson, Private Rights].
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that where public ownership reduces the ability to capture indi-
vidual gains there will be less incentive to make long run invest-
ments and pursue high quality management.1 41 In 1952, a leading
western land economist observed that "as long as the public land
manager insists on absolute liberty to alter the use to which graz-
ing land is committed or to change the user to which it is ra-
tioned, the private firm user . . . will distort his inputs toward
short-run returns, including deterioration of the resource." 42
Existing arrangements also misallocate access to the federal
rangelands among different types of users. 143 The requirement of
base property ownership means that many ranchers who do not
own such property, who in turn may place a higher value on the
federal land forage, are denied the opportunity to gain access to
this forage. The federal land agencies have also acted to place
tight limitations on subleasing federal land forage, thus further
ensuring that some ranchers who might value the forage less,
will use it in place of other ranchers who might value it more.144
141. Adam Smith was of the opinion that:
In all the great monarchies of Europe, there are still
many large tracts of land which belong to the crown. They
are generally forest; and sometimes forest where, after travel-
ing miles, you will scarce find a single tree . . . When the
crown lands had become private property, they would, in the
course of a few years, become well improved and well culti-
vated. The increase of their produce would... augment the
revenue and consumption of the people . . . [and] the reve-
nue which the crown derives from the duties of customs and
excise ...
It would, in all cases, be for the interest of society to re-
place this revenue to the crown by some other equal reve-
nue, and to divide the lands among the people, which could
not well be done better, perhaps, than by exposing them to
public sale.
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH
OF NATIONS 775-76 (Edwin .Cannon ed., Random House 1937) (1776).
142. M.M. Kelso, Economic Analysis of Land Use on the Western
Ranges, 281 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 143 (May 1954), quoted in
Robert K. Davis, Which Direction Rangeland Reform?, in CURRENT ISSUES IN
RANGELAND ECONOMICS, supra note 37, at 8.
143. See LIECAP, supra note 96, at 100-01.
144. The Forest Service prohibits subleasing. SeeJohanna H. Wald,
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Finally, those who might value the use of the livestock forage
more highly for nongrazing purposes such as hunting, watershed
protection, or simple aesthetics have been denied the opportu-
nity to purchase it altogether.145
One early economist to criticize these features was Delworth
Gardner, long a leading U.S. agricultural economist and now
professor emeritus at Brigham Young University. In a 1962 article
in the Journal of Farm Economics, Gardner concluded that "the in-
ability of the [forage] resources to move to their highest eco-
nomic use impedes economic development by diminishing the
product that might have been taken from the resource." 146 In a
1963 followup article in the same journal, Gardner examined
how this problem might be resolved.1 47
Gardner observed that greater security of tenure would be de-
sirable, a goal that could be achieved if the grazing "permit were
a 'right' to graze a given number of AUMs ... in perpetuity."148
Gardner specifically proposed that government should
create perpetual permits covering redesignated allotments
and issue them to ranchers who presently hold permits in ex-
change for those now in use. These permits would be similar to
any other piece of property that can be bought and sold in a
free market. These permittees would be completely free to re-
tain or to dispose of the new permits to whomever they wished,
for whatever price they could agree on.149
If the government were to decide to reduce grazing, it would still
have this prerogative, but it "would be required to compensate
the permittee for his loss."150
Gardner conceded that "if many small operators should decide
to discontinue ranching because they choose to sell their public
grazing, then local, rural communities may suffer somewhat
Beleaguered Rangelands Signify Policy Failure, 11 FORUM 36 (1996). The Bu-
reau of Land Management allows subleasing but imposes a surcharge
on the difference between the government grazing fee and the sub-
lease rate. See RANGELAND REFORM '94, supra note 116, at 2-3.
145. See Public Grazing Laws, supra note 111, at 44.
146. Gardner, Role of Economic Analysis, supra note 48, at 50.
147. See Gardner, Grazing Permits, supra note 140.
148. Id. at 115.
149. Id. at 117.
150. Id. at 116.
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through these 'neighborhood' effects." 5' However, he consid-
ered that improvements in the operation of the grazing market
"would almost certainly more than offset" any negative im-
pacts.5 2 In any case, new economic forces would win out,
whether ranchers approved or not. It would be better to have a
fair and orderly process, one that compensated ranchers as they
made way for potentially new and more valuable uses, as would
happen if the changes occurred through voluntary transactions.
Absent this outlet, recreational and other groups would have no
choice but to attain their goals in a zero-sum-game effort in the
political process, using command-and-control devices.
Gardner's proposal to formally establish forage rights circu-
lated for many years in the academic world but otherwise gener-
ated little interest. 53 By the early 1990s, however, it received new
attention as a practical way of addressing public rangeland
problems. Writing for the Journal of Range and Water Conservation,
Professor Jerry Holechek of New Mexico State University ob-
served that "the effect of livestock grazing on riparian habitats is
a major [environmental] concern." 154 He estimated that grazing
might need to be eliminated over 10 percent of federal range-
lands, as well as other areas where grazing was problematic. 155 To
accomplish this, Holechek suggested, "the most practical and eq-
uitable solution when major conflicts develop between recreation
and livestock grazing may be for the government to purchase the
grazing permit from the rancher at fair market value on a willing
seller/willing buyer basis."'1 56 Holechek estimated that the
purchase price would be $70 to $90 per AUM, requiring total
spending of up to $80 million to acquire the federal rangelands'
permits with highest environmental priority.5 7 Given the deep
public concern over the quality of the rangeland environment,
151. Id. at 120.
152. Id.
153. See sources cited supra note 140. See also Robert H. Nelson, Im-
prving Market Mechanisms in U.S. Forestry, in REDIRECTING THE RPA: PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE 1987 AIRLIE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON THE RESOURCES
PLANNING ACT 90-91 (C. Binkley et al. eds., 1988).
154. Holechek, supra note 40, at 171.
155. See id.
156. Id. at 172. See also Hess & Holechek, supra note 112, at 22-24;
Jerry Holechek & Karl Hess, Jr., Market Forces Would Benefit U.S. Range-
lands 11 FORUM 5-15 (Winter 1996).
157. See Holechek, supra note 40, at 172.
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and the magnitude of government expenditures devoted to
resolving rangeland environmental controversies, spending $80
million would be a reasonable cost.
Robert K. Davis served in the Office of Policy Analysis in the
Interior Department from 1976 to 1984 as director of the eco-
nomics staff, the chief economist serving the Secretary of the In-
terior.158 By the 1990s, having left Interior for the University of
Colorado, Davis publicly advocated an approach similar to
Holechek's proposal. At a grazing conference he proposed a new
regime of "free-choice environmentalism." 1 9 The existing restric-
tions on holding a grazing permit would be eliminated, making
it possible for environmental, hunting and other groups to
purchase permits. If they chose to retain their permits, ranchers
would obtain the greater security of tenure. Such a system, Davis
argued, would mean that "the need for a command and control
bureaucracy armed with a heavy regulatory fist would disappear
along with the clamor for increasingly byzantine procedural en-
tanglement and unproductive public participation. ' 160 Market
forces would determine the future uses of federal rangeland for-
age, rather than a failing BLM planning system.
Professor David Lambert of the University of Nevada expressed
similar views at the 1994 annual meeting of the Western Eco-
nomic Association. Although he was skeptical about complete
privatization through "transferring title of western U.S. public
rangelands," he concluded that "the property rights' literature
does suggest that delimitation of property rights is a precursor
for efficient exchange." 16 1 As he stated:
What appears to be missing in the public rangeland debate is
the establishment of clear rules of the game. Without well-
defined property rights, transaction costs are high. Efficient ex-
change would seem to require that all users clearly understand
their rights in current and future public land grazing decisions
regardless of the outcome of the current legislative debates
over grazing policy. 62
158. My own exposure to grazing issues began in this office, where
I served from 1975 to 1993.
159. Davis, supra note 142, at 4.
160. Id. at 5.
161. David K Lambert, Grazing on Public Rangelands: An Evolving
Problem of Property Rights, 13 CoNTEMP. ECON. POL'Y 127 (1995).
162. Id.
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The Different Drummer, a leading voice for market-based envi-
ronmental policies, picked up on the same theme. In a 1994 is-
sue devoted to "Reforming the Western Range," the editors, Karl
Hess, Jr. and Randal O'Toole, proposed creating "forage
rights" 163 that could be "openly bought and sold by environmen-
tal groups, ranchers, state wildlife agencies, and other public
land users."164
Most recently, the 1997 Economic Report of the President reflected
the influence of such thinking among economists. The report,
prepared by President Clinton's Council of Economic Advisors,
proposed making grazing rights freely saleable and transfer-
rable. 165 As the report commented, grazing and other extractive
"resources from Federal public land often have exclusive rights
in a given area for the activity in which they are engaged; this is
one sense in which public lands have already been partially priva-
tized." 166 The Economic Report also suggested that privatization
could be extended further:
Some rights to extract resources from public lands are cur-
rently tradeable in a limited sense. For example, Federal graz-
ing permits are often transferred with the sale of a ranch to
other qualified ranchers. One possibly beneficial reform would
be to allow conservation interests to compete for extraction
rights on an equal basis with other interests. For example, envi-
ronmental groups could acquire grazing permits and use the
land to introduce native plant species and improve wildlife
habitat, or acquire permits for the use of timberland and per-
manently retire that land from commercial harvesting. Such
voluntary transactions can provide value to the seller as well as
to the buyer, and thereby maximize the value received by all el-
ements of society from the stock of public land.167
By the mid 1990s there was a considerable body of writings, re-
flecting varying political outlooks, favoring the creation of a new
rights regime on the federal rangelands. As environmental
groups have also become interested, the discussion has moved
into the political arena and implementation has become a
possibility.
163. Public Grazing Laws, supra note 111, at 24.
164. Id. at 54.
165. See ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 226 (Council Econ.
Advisors, Feb. 1997).
166. Id. at 220.
167. Id. at 224.
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V. How TO ESTABLISH FORAGE RIGHTS ON FEDERAL FORESTS AND
RANGELANDS
In order to implement a regime of rights to the forage on fed-
eral rangelands, a number of key changes from the current
rangeland system are necessary. The starting point would be a
recognition that the existing rancher holding a grazing permit
on federal lands would continue to hold this permit. Existing
grazing permits would be grandfathered and newly recognized as
a formal matter of right. In the process, the actions. allowed
under the permit, the provisions for transferring it, the types of
parties eligible to hold it, and the character of the permit itself
would be changed.
A. Eliminate the Use-It-Or-Lose-It Requirement
The BLM has interpreted the Taylor Grazing Act in governing
access to federal rangelands for the grazing of domestic live-
stock.16 The law does not, the BLM states, convey any rights, for-
mal or informal, to control the type of use, or to decide not to
use the forage at all in order to serve some nongrazing pur-
pose.169 Rather, the rancher receives a temporary permit to use
the federal lands for the specific purpose intended by the gov-
ernment, grazing livestock. Such a decision, the BLM and Forest
Service have insisted, should be based on land use planning
grounded in scientific calculations of rancher livestock needs,
grazing capacity, levels of public demand for alternative uses, de-
grees of conflict among uses, and various other considerations. 170
Ranchers have been able to "take non-use," meaning they do
not graze as much as their government permit allows. 17' They
may cut back on grazing because of drought or other temporary
climatic conditions; because they regard BLM's permitted level of
grazing as greater than the actual grazing capacity of the land;
because they do not need the forage in a particular year Under
their grazing plan; or for a host of other possible reasons. In
1993, the actual use of BLM grazing lands was approximately 25
168. See Gardner, Role of Economic Analysis, supra note 48, at 110.
169. See RANGELAND REFORM '94, supra note 116, at 71.
170. See PUB. LAND L. REv. COMM'N, supra note 52, at 45-48.
171. RANGELAND REFORM '94, supra note 116, at 5.
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percent less than the amount formally authorized by the
government.172
However, a rancher can not end grazing altogether, or aban-
don grazing a major part of an allotment, where there is forage
available for livestock consumption. If a rancher were to do so,
the BLM would consider itself under a legal obligation to trans-
fer the permit to a rancher willing to use the allotment land for
the grazing of livestock.173
In 1994, as part of his overall rangeland reform package, Inte-
rior Secretary Bruce Babbitt proposed revising the traditional
BLM policy, allowing "conservation use" of the allotment.1
74
Under the new policy, a rancher could remove livestock for an
extended period of time, conceivably the full duration of the
permit. However, this action was of uncertain legality under
traditional interpretations of the Taylor Grazing Act. Indeed, in
the summer of 1996, a Wyoming federal judge ruled that several
key provisions of the Babbitt regulations, including the new al-
lowance of conservation use, violated the provisions of the Taylor
Act.1 75 Even without such a ruling, conservation use would still be
an option limited to grazing permit holders in the livestock
business.
To resolve this matter, Congress would have to eliminate the
use-it-or-lose-it requirement. That would put all parties on an
equal footing in seeking to control the forage resources of the
federal lands.
B. Eliminate the Base Property Requirement
Under the Taylor Grazing Act, ranchers have been required to
own nearby private property, which sometimes consists of water
rights alone, complementary to grazing.1 76 As noted above, this
172. The total grazing privileges allocated by BLM to ranchers in
1993 were 13.3 million AUMs. The amount of actual grazing use au-
thorized by BLM in 1993 was 9.8 million AUMs. See PUBLic LAND STATIS-
TICS 1993, supra note 36, at 24-27.
173. See Public Grazing Laws, supra note 111, at 24.
174. RANGELAND REFORM '94, supra note 116, at 15.
175. See Public Lands Council et al. v. Babbitt, 929 F Supp. 1436,
1440 (D. Wyo. 1996).
176. Foss, supra note 25, at 62-63.
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"base property" requirement was designed to ensure that when
the public rangelands were initially carved up into allotments,
only local ranchers would be eligible.
The base property requirement does not prevent an environ-
mental or other nonranching group from, purchasing the grazing
permit for an allotment. However, it means that the group, like a
rancher, would have to buy private base property. This would sig-
nificantly increase permit costs. Moreover, the nonranching
buyer would be required to maintain the base property in the
ranching business to retain the permit. That might not be feasi-
ble in some cases and in others it would be a significant
complication.
In many instances, a nonranching group may be interested in
only a portion of the grazing permit. It may want to buy the for-
age rights in a riparian area to exclude livestock from the area
and to improve the fishing. The group may want to buy the for-
age rights to an upland meadow to provide feed for big horn
sheep or some other species. However, there may not be any lo-
cal ranchers interested in selling off adequate base property.
Thus, transfers of forage rights beneficial to all the parties in-
volved could be easily blocked by the base property requirement.
The complications posed by the use-it-or-lose-it and base prop-
erty requirements of the current system were illustrated in the
Las Vegas case noted above. Government officials sought to elim-
inate the grazing over certain areas as part of a habitat conserva-
tion plan for the desert tortoise. The Clark County Desert Con-
servation Plan commented that grazing privileges "may not
simply be retired . . . If not utilized by the owner, another graz-
ing operator may apply for and utilize the land for grazing pur-
poses, unless the BLM has agreed in advance that the owner may
hold them in 'nonuse.' In order to hold the privileges in non-
use, the holder must operate a grazing business." 177
Since the counties that had actually purchased the grazing
rights were not in the grazing business, a solution was devised
wherein the grazing permits would be assigned to the Nature
Conservancy in trust.1 78 Since the Nature Conservancy owned
177. Desert Conversation Plan, supra note 66, at 97.
178. See id.
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grazing operations within Nevada, the BLM agreed to accept this
special arrangement as meeting the base property requirement,
even though this meant stretching the letter of the law. The Na-
ture Conservancy could only obtain a commitment from the
BLM to accept nonuse status for the first two years, with new ap-
plications for nonuse requiring annual approval thereafter. Be-
cause of the significant uncertainties associated with the nonuse
status, the tortoise conservation plan found it necessary to pro-
vide additional funding "to protect and defend those privileges
in nonuse until such time, if ever, that grazing is prohibited by
the Stateline RMP."1 9
Eliminating the base property requirement would also allow
livestock operations without base property to purchase such per-
mits. The resulting increase in demands for permits and higher
selling prices would benefit ranchers. It would promote the effi-
ciency of the overall livestock industry by ensuring that access to
grazing on federal lands is obtained by the parties that place the
highest value on grazing.
C. Eliminate the Requirement that the Holder of a Grazing Permit
Must Be a Livestock Operator
Another restrictive element of the existing system is the re-
quirement that the holder of a grazing permit must be a quali-
fied livestock operator.180 This requirement, like the active use
and base property requirements, reflects the implicit assumption
of the Taylor Act that the only legitimate use of the forage re-
source is for direct productive or consumptive purposes. It is an
outgrowth of the general utilitarian philosophy of the conserva-
tion movement early in this century. Gifford Pinchot, the
founder of the Forest Service, often said that the purpose of na-
tional forests was to supply wood, water and other outputs to
meet the productive needs of the nation. 81 Pinchot opposed cre-
179. Id.
180. See RANGELAND REFORM '94, supra note 116, at 2-3.
181. Pinchot argued that "The object of our forest policy is not to
preserve the forests because they are beautiful ... or because they are
refuges for the wild creatures of the wilderness ... but the making of
prosperous homes. . . . Every other consideration comes as secondary."
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ating national parks as leading to a waste of valuable timber and
other resources.18 2 Other leaders showed similar attitudes towards
the development of the federal land system with respect to the
forage resources.'
D. Eliminate Restrictions on Subleasing
Historically, the Forest Service has prohibited subleasing of
grazing rights to an allotment.18 4 The BLM has allowed subleas-
ing, but with significant limitations, including a recent require-
ment that the rancher turn over to the BLM a share of any sub-
leasing revenues that exceed the federal grazing fee. 185 These
restrictions on subleasing reflect the difficulty of reconciling a
scientific management philosophy with the workings of a market
process. Scientific management says that the full details of the al-
lotment use should be carefully planned by the government, a
process likely to be disrupted by frequent changes in the opera-
tor's identity and grazing plan.
Opposition of federal officials to subleasing has also been sig-
nificantly increased by the fact that ranchers often charge their
sublessees much higher prices per AUM than the grazing fee col-
lected by the government. At typical sublease rate is in the range
of $5 to $7 per AUM (and sometimes much higher), while the
federal government in recent years has collected less than $2 per
AUM from its own grazing fee.18 6 Critics charge that ranchers
who sublease are profiting unfairly from the resale of public
resources.
8 7
However, the existence of subleasing does not in any way di-
minish the government return; it merely illustrates that the gov-
HAyS, supra note 16, at 41-42.
182. Id. at 40, 127, 195-96.
183. A long time leading range textbook defined the task of
rangeland management as "the science and art of planning and di-
recting range use so as to obtain the maximum livestock production
consistent with conservation of the range resources." LAURENCE STOD-
DARD & ARTHUR D. SMITH, RANGE MANAGEMENT 2 (1943).
184. See Wald, supra note 144, at 36.
185. See id.
186. See GRAZING FEE REvIEw, supra note 39, at 14, 67-68.
187. See Wald, sup-a note 144, at 36.
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ernment is getting less than the private rate. Fairness is not the
real issue to the government; rather, federal officials seek to
avoid public embarrassment. The actual market value of the sub-
lease may be difficult to determine, because ranchers who sub-
lease public land forage often provide services to sublessees and
make improvements on the land that the government does not
provide in its own grazing lands management.' 8
Despite historic agency attitudes, subleasing should be an inte-
gral part of a market regime for public land forage. It offers flex-
ibility to devise innovative arrangements among ranchers and
other groups that otherwise would be precluded. For example,
during drought conditions a hunting club may want to sublease
an area to maintain all the forage there for wildlife on a tempo-
rary basis. This may also work to the advantage of the rancher if
the sublease payment is enough to purchase livestock feed sup-
plies from alternative sources, perhaps leaving something left
over for profit.
Long run subleasing would allow environmental groups to
control grazing activity in an area at less than the full cost, possi-
bly phasing it out altogether. Ranchers and environmental
groups might attempt a joint working relationship, or experi-
ment with a resource management concept, without the perma-
nency of outright sale and purchase. In some cases, a lease may
lead to purchase, after the effectiveness of the new arrangements
has been demonstrated.
In the future environmental organizations that have purchased
public land forage rights might find that they want to sublease to
a livestock operator. By purchasing the grazing permit outright,
the environmental group would obtain full control over the for-
age. It could then set the precise terms and conditions of any
livestock grazing. With this assurance, grazing might be a useful
element in a resource management plan to improve rangeland
conditions.18 9 Additionally, the environmental groups' revenues
might be an important contribution to the financial viability of
the overall acquisition, effectively reducing the net cost.
188. See RANGELAND REFORM '94, supra note 116, at 2-3.
189. See HOLECHEK ET AL, supra note 13, at 127-29, 356-62.
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Subleasing is one example of a broader category of financial
arrangements short of outright purchase. Environmental organi-
zations could purchase easements or stipulations from ranchers
concerning the operation of the livestock business. For example,
they might negotiate an agreement to compensate a rancher for
taking cattle off a pasture earlier in the year. This could benefit
elk habitat, even while raising the costs of ranching. The envi-
ronmental organization might compensate a rancher for chang-
ing the grazing system to remove cattle permanently from a par-
ticular section of an allotment. They might reach an agreement
to pay all or part of the costs for the installation of fences to
keep cattle out of riparian areas or for constructing water facili-
ties that would also benefit wildlife.
E. Shift From a Permit System to a Leasing System for Forage Rights
As discussed above, ranchers operating on federal rangelands
at present hold a permit issued by the government to graze a
certain number of livestock during certain periods of the year on
a particular area of public land. If the rancher sells the permit to
an environmental organization, however, the new owner will
probably not be interested mainly in grazing livestock. Indeed,
the objective in some cases may be to remove the grazing activity
altogether. In this new circumstance, the form of the legal agree-
ment between the government and the forage user should be re-
vised. Instead of a permit to graze, the agreement should take
the form of a lease to the forage resource.
A shift to a leasing approach would recognize that it will no
longer be possible for the government to charge for the use of
the land based upon the amount of livestock grazing. The cur-
rent grazing fee is assessed per month of grazing per animal.
Hence, if an environmental organization were to purchase the
permit and retire the grazing, it would not pay any fee under the
current arrangements. In a real sense, however, the environmen-
tal group would still be making use of the forage. In addition, an
efficient process of market competition, one that ensured that
the highest value user would win out, would require that each
party face the same future payment obligations. Otherwise, the
rancher might be unfairly disadvantaged, because he would be
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required to pay for use of the same forage that another party
might receive for free.
As part of a new regime of forage rights, the government
should no longer charge based upon the amount of livestock
grazed. The lease rate should be set as a flat dollar payment per
acre. Preferably, the lease charge may vary with the forage pro-
ductivity of the land. One simple procedure would be to take the
current grazing permit, calculate the amount of forage available
under that permit, apply a reasonable grazing fee (say $2 to $4
per AUM) and fix the annual lease payment at that dollar
amount. For example, if the current grazing permit allowed 500
AUMs per year, the annual lease payment would then be set at
$1,000 to $2,000 per year, independent of whether there was any
grazing on the allotment. Such a payment should also be ad-
justed over time for inflation.
The current duration of a grazing permit is ten years.1 90 How-
ever, this period is too short given the slow response of vegeta-
tion in arid western climates and the need for long term tenure
to create strong incentives to improve and maintain the land.
The term of forage leases ought to be in the range of 25 to 50
years. There is a strong case for issuing leases for an indefinite
period.
If leases are not of indefinite duration, lease renewals should
be renegotiated well before the end of the lease term, perhaps
five or ten years before. This would avoid any negative incentives
that might arise near the end of the term due to uncertainty
over renewal. The existing lease holder should have priority for
renewal.' 9' Similarly, under existing federal mineral leases, the
terms are renegotiated at the end of the 10 to 20 year term, and
changes can be made, although the operator retains the basic
right to continue the mineral operation.192
190. See RANGELAND REFORM '94, supra note 116, at 4.
191. There might, however, be some opportunity to reconsider the
specific environmental and other terms of the lease.
192. Federal coal leases are for 20 years and are then renegotiated,
as long as production is still occurring. See NELSON, FEDERAL COAL POL,
icy, supra note 16, at 21. Oil and gas leases on the Outer Continental
Shelf typically have a term of 5 or 10 years and are then negotiated. See
R. ScoTT FARRow, MANAGING THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF LANDS 5
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VI. DEFINING A FORAGE RIGHT
As proposed here, the leased forage rights would be a part of
the bundle of rights associated with federal lands. Just as land
rights are sometimes divided into surface and mineral compo-
nents, so to is possible to-subdivide surface rights. Leases to the
forage portion of surface rights could be issued to ranchers or
other parties in the same way that the government issues leases
to the subsurface oil, gas, or coal rights. Of essential importance
is the specification of the full dimension of the forage right
when the lease is first issued.
The core right would be the control over the use of the forage
resources in the allotment. This right of use would not be abso-
lute, however, and it must reflect the fact that there exist other
de facto rights in holders' bundles of rights. These existing
rights holders, based on long historic presence on the land, can
include hunters and fishermen, hikers, birdwatchers, miners, off
road vehicle users, to name a few. The flexibility of the forage
lessee would be limited by the requirement that the pre-existing
rights of other parties must not be infringed upon. The same
standard is applied in nuisance law: the forage rights holder is
free to take any action so long as it does not result in significant
harm to another party. The easy transference of nuisance law
principles to the resolution of the appropriate boundaries be-
tween individual forage and other rights holders on federal
rangelands makes the application of nuisance theory even more
compelling.19 3
In order to protect nonranching rights, it is likely that an
amount of forage would have to be made available for wildlife
every year, reflecting the historic levels of availability of such for-
age. Forage amounts might have to be specified by plant type, as
well as wildlife, as each have differing requirements.1 94 Adverse
impacts on fishing and downstream water quality must also be
minimized by the lessee. This might be determined by the practi-
(1990).
193. See DENNIS COYLE, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE CONSTITUTION:
SHAPING SOCIETY THROUGH LAND USE REGULATION 17-18 (1993).
194. See HOLECHEK ET AL., supra note 13, at 373-75.
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cal application of the Clean Water Act to the operational use of
the forage.
Forage rights holders would be expected to provide protection
for the streambanks and the water quality of riparian areas. If
cattle damage these areas, their removal, or the adoption of
tighter rancher controls over animal movements, would be man-
dated. Application of the Endangered Species Act with its limita-
tion on the rights of private land owners would be appropriate
to the exercise of forage rights. Thus, if cattle grazing adversely
impacted the desert tortoise by damaging its burrows, competing
for forage, etc., mitigating actions would be essential.
If these actions create excessive burdens on forage rights hold-
ers, the requirements of the Endangered Species Act could prove
counter-productive.195 An effective system of species protection
must create positive incentives for land and other rights holders
to assist with species preservation. Current property law may pe-
nalize a land owner for providing habitat protection or otherwise
assisting with species preservation.
In practice, it requires considerable negotiation to fully define
the limits on the future exercise of a forage right. Much as graz-
ing levels and the boundaries of allotments were set by local
rancher groups following the enactment in 1934 of the Taylor
Grazing Act, 196 such a negotiation is most effective on a local
level. However, membership must be expanded to reflect the full
diversity of current users and de facto rights holders. One possi-
bility is to assign the task to the Resource Advisory Councils that
have been established under the new Babbitt rangeland pro-
gram. 97 Subsequent monitoring which ensures that the lease pro-
visions are being observed is also essential. The Resource Advi-
sory Councils could play an important role in this matter as well.
This monitoring effort could be contracted out to private par-
ties. Third-party certification is currently widely employed in tim-
ber management and in other natural resource fields.198 Outside
195. See Ike C. Sugg, Caught in the Act: Evaluating the Endangered
Species Act, Its Effects on Man and Prospects for Reform, 24 CuMB. L. REv. 46
(1993).
196. See Foss, supra note 25, at 64.
197. See RANGELAND REFORM '94, supra note 116, at 16-17.
198. See CERTIFICATION OF FOREST PRODUCTS: ISSUES AND PERSPEC-
CREATING FORAGE RIGHTS
private firms that specialize in this field often certify to the man-
ufacturers of furniture or other wood products that the timber
used has been harvested in an environmentally sensitive way. A
similar process could be used to certify that the holders of fed-
eral land forage rights are acting consistent with their lease obli-
gations and the rights of others.
A. A Full Private Property Rights Regime: An Outline for a
Condominium Approach
Another option is to put the entire matter into the hands of
the private sector. If the historical rights such as hunting, min-
ing, and recreation were formally recognized, governmental own-
ership of public lands would become superfluous, and one
would no longer speak of leasing forage rights. In place of fed-
eral rangelands, a new system of private property rights in which
the newly defined private rights would include a complex blend
of individual and collective rights, would be appropriate.
One of the difficulties in such an approach is that, unlike a
rancher's forage rights, there is no one well-defined party to
whom the recreational and other nonranching rights can be ap-
propriately assigned. Who speaks for "hunters" or "fishermen"?
New institutional mechanisms may be necessary in the future,
if recreational and other nonranching rights are to be trans-
ferred more directly to the beneficiaries.1 99 An appropriate
model might be a residential community association, typically or-
ganized with a condominium. 2°° In a traditional condominium,
TIVEs 5-6 (Virgilio M. Viana et al. eds., 1996).
199. For a similar proposal in the context of urban land use, see
NELSON, ZONING, supra note 22. See also Robert H. Nelson, Private Neigh-
borhoods: A New Direction for the Neighborhood Movement, in LAND REFORM,
AMERICAN STYLE (Charles C. Geisler & Frank J. Popper eds., 1984); Rob-
ert H. Nelson, A Private Property Right Theory of Zoning, 11 URB. LAw. 713
(1979); Robert H. Nelson, Zoning Myth and Practice - From Euclid into
the Future, in ZONING AND THE AMERICAN DREAM: PROMISES STILL TO KEEP
299-318 (Charles Haar & Jerold Kayden eds., 1989).
200. See RCA Characteristics and Issues, in RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY AS-
SOCIATIONS: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS IN THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM? 9-
23 (Papers from a Policy Conference Sponsored by the U.S. Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, May 1989); see also
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the rights to the property are separated into the individual rights
of the unit owners and the communal rights to control the com-
mon areas, a right exercised through a collective decision mak-
ing instrument. In a rangeland condominium, the individually
held rights would be the forage rights, which grant control over
the use of the grazing forage resources. The common elements
would consist of the collective rights to oversee nonranching uses
of the total allotment area. This might consist, for example, of a
large block of land containing say 625 square miles (25 mile by
25 miles), within which there might also be found 30 allotments,
each with its own individual forage rights.
The decision making mechanism for such a condominium
would be more complex than a standard urban condominium.
There would not be significant problems for holders of forage
rights to individual grazing allotments, who could be given repre-
sentation on the condominium board of directors. However,
there would be a greater challenge for groups such as hunters
and fishermen. Perhaps two positions for hunters, and two posi-
tions for fishermen, would be set aside on the rangeland condo-
minium board of directors. There might similarly be two repre-
sentatives for hikers, and two for all other forms of dispersed
recreation. The problem would be determining an appropriate
method for selecting such representation.
One possibility would be to specify that each hunter wishing to
use the lands within the total area encompassed by the condo-
minium boundaries might be required to pay a nominal annual
fee. All hunters who paid the fee would then be eligible to vote
on the hunter representation to the condominium board of di-
rectors. A similar approach could be applied to fishermen, and
possibly as well for people who have a potential interest in min-
eral exploration.
There might also be representation for the set of people that
are simply interested in the general environmental quality of the
lands within the condominium boundaries. Again, members of
this group might be charged a nominal annual fee (smaller than
hunters, since there would be no direct benefit expected), and
GEORGE W. LIEBMANN, THE LITTLE PLATOONS: SUBLOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN
MODERN HIsTORY 53-90 (1995).
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elect its appointed representatives by vote of all those who have
paid this amount. Members might be able to assign their vote by
proxy, as shareholders in a corporation do. In some areas of spe-
cial environmental interest, many of the proxy votes might be as-
signed to environmental groups such as the Sierra Club or Wil-
derness Society.
Under such a structure of condominium ownership, decisions
with respect to the use of grazing forage in particular allotments
would be made exclusively by the individual holders of the for-
age rights there. Collective decisions involving issues of manage-
ment of the common rangeland area for recreation, wildlife pro-
tection or other joint purposes would be made through the
collective decision making mechanisms of the condominium.
The collective responsibilities would include matters such as ar-
rangements for access to the lands for hunting, fishing, and
other activities, as well as any charges imposed by the condomin-
ium for public entry for these purposes.
In order to implement a full condominium privatization, more
details beyond the brief sketch offered here would have to be
provided. Until a privatization of the public rangelands can oc-
cur through establishing a condominium arrangement, the indi-
vidual rights to grazing forage would be defined in the context
of continuing government ownership of the rangelands.
The best form of government ownership may be state or local,
rather than federal.2 1 The ownership of the Forest Service and
201. Jon Souder and Sally Fairfax conclude that the management
practices on state owned "trust lands" in a number of cases yield supe-
rior results to federal land management:
For far too long we have proceeded as if the multiple-
use concept - most particularly as practiced by the U.S. For-
est Service - were the only feasible approach to resource
development. . . . As the Forest Service model becomes
more and more widely recognized as a failure, or as falling
apart, or both, the quest for new visions of public resource
management grows increasingly urgent. As we begin to rec-
ognize that sustainable use, rather than destructive use or ab-
stinent nonuse, is the most pressing challenge, the utility of
the [state] trusts lands model becomes increasingly apparent.
JON A. SOUDER & SALLY K FAIRFAX, STATE TRUST LANDS: HISTORY, MAN-
AGEMENT, AND SUSTAINABLE USE 293 (1996).
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BLM lands involves the federal government in a wide range of is-
sues of essentially state and local significance. Applying tradi-
tional American concepts of federalism, responsibility for these
matters should lie at the state and local levels of government.2°2
There are many political obstacles to a transfer of federal lands
to the states. 203 One of the more important is the uncertainty
many ranchers would feel about their future tenure status under
new state ownership of the lands and related matters such as per-
mitted livestock numbers and grazing fees. A clearer resolution
and formal codification of rancher rights on the federal lands, as
proposed in this paper, may be a necessary first step, before any
transfer of lands to the states could become politically viable.2°4
B. Some Precedents
There are a number of precedents for creating a market in
federal forage rights. Consider the communications spectrum
consisting of numerous frequencies suitable to many types of
uses.205 The communications spectrum might be regarded as an-
other form of public domain. Much as Forest Service and BLM
have allocated grazing privileges for public lands, the Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC") has long issued licenses
to use spectrum suitable to radio and television to applicants
who agree to meet certain public service obligations.206 Over time
it became a recognized practice that selling the station would
mean the automatic transfer of the spectrum rights to the new
owner.20 7 The spectrum rights have had a substantial value of
202. See Federal Forest Management: Hearings before the Subcomm. on
Forests and Public Land Management of the Senate Comm. on Energy and Nat-
ural Resources, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 361-70 (1995) (Statement of Robert
H. Nelson, Professor Envtl. Pol'y, Sch. Pub. Aff., U. Md.). See generally
ROBERT H. NELSON, HOW TO DISMANTLE THE INTERIOR DEPARTMENT
(Competitive Enterprise Inst., June 1995).
203. See MARION CLAWSON, THE FEDERAL LANDS REVISITED 188-89
(1983).
204. See NELSON, How AND WHY, supra note 44, at 36-37.
205. See BRUCE M. OWEN & STEPHEN S. WILDMAN, VIDEO ECONOMICS
15 (1992).
206. See id. at 16-17.
207. See id. at 16.
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their own, independent of the capital value of the building and
station facilities. Also, when they have come up for renewal, the
FCC has almost always reissued these rights to the same station
which held them.20 8 Yet, like forage rights to public grazing
lands, the FCC has never officially recognized control over the
spectrum as separable from the existence of an actual operating
station.20
In recent years, advances in communications technology have
meant that parts of the spectrum not previously in use have now
become valuable. In cases where no prior use exists, the FCC has
begun auctioning spectrum rights directly, yielding more than
$20 billion in revenues.2 10 In effect, the FCC has now recognized
a spectrum right as existing independent of any particular use or
physical facility, equivalent to abandoning the base property re-
quirement on public grazing lands and issuing a lease of indefi-
nite duration. Similarly it would be possible to auction off the
forage lease rights on vacant grazing allotments to the highest
bidder.
While FCC chairman Reed Hundt spoke out in favor of a new
concept, "spectrum flexibility," which he described as "the com-
plete opposite of the original FCC approach."211 Traditionally,
the holder of an FCC license has been required to use it for the
purpose identified by the license, whether for television, radio,
cellular telephones, paging, or some other use. Under the new
concept, the license holder would be free to convert the licensed
spectrum from one use to another without FCC approval. Spec-
trum now used for an existing radio station might be converted
to use for cellular telephones, if the licensee believed it would be
more profitable. 212 The market, rather than the FCC, would de-
termine the uses of the spectrum. This concept is directly analo-
gous to the proposal made in this paper with respect to the for-
208. See ROGER G. NOLL ET AL., ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF TELEVISION
REGULATION 115 (1973).
209. FTC never formally recognized transfer "right."
210. See ECONoMIc REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 161, at
214.
211. James K. Glassman, Reed Hundt's Revolution, WASH. POST, Mar.
15, 1997, at A15.
212. See id.
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age use rights of the federal rangelands, and it is currently
attracting attention at the highest levels in telecommunications
policy.
The definition of new types of rights is also being discussed for
fisheries, involving creation of "individual transferrable quotas"
("ITQs"), in hopes of resolving the commons situation that has
resulted in severe depletion of the Grand Banks and a number
of other major American fisheries.213 Wherever a scarce physical
resource is currently controlled by government regulation, it may
well be possible to shift to establishing a system of property
rights as a means of allocating resource use.214
VII. MOVING PAST SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT
In economic terms, federal land forage is not an especially val-
uable resource, in comparison with many other natural re-
sources. However, the treatment of livestock grazing on western
rangelands has great symbolic significance nationally. Americans
define their basic values partly by reference to the policies they
adopt for forests, rangelands and other natural resources. The
progressive era early in this century marked a shift to a paradigm
of scientific management in administering the federal forests and
rangelands of the United States. Today, the nation is searching
for new institutions and values to replace a failing progressive
design.215
In moving past scientific management, the policies adopted for
federal rangelands will be an important arena for exploring new
213. See Terry L. Anderson & Donald R. Leal, Fishing for Property
Rights to Fish, in TAKING THE ENVIRONMENT SERIOUSLY 167 (Roger E.
Meiners & Bruce Yandle eds., 1993).
214. See Nelson, Private Rights, supra note 140, at 381.
215. See Sterling Brubaker, Issues and Summary of Federal Land Ten-
ure, in RETHINKING THE FEDERAL LANDS, supra note 52, at 1, 2-3; NELSON,
PUBLIC LANDS, supra note 12; RANDAL O'TOoLE, REFORMING THE FOREST
SERVICE (1988); John Baden & Andrew Dana, Toward an Ideological Syn-
thesis in Public Land Policy: The New Resource Economics, in FEDERAL LANDS
POLICY 1-20 (Phillip 0. Foss ed., 1987); WESTERN PUBLIC LANDS: THE
MANAGEMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES IN A TIME OF DECLINING FEDERALISM
(John G. Francis & Richard Ganzel eds., 1984).
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visions.216 If scientific management offered the prospect of the
one best scientific answer, in the future there is likely to be a
pluralism of visions for the federal lands.2 7 Each answer will mix
technical and value considerations. Without greater agreement in
American society, to impose one solution would mean imposing
of one set of values on others. It is better to leave such decisions
to local people who resolve their problems in a cooperative and
voluntary manner, in many cases through private transactions
among willing buyers and sellers. A system of property rights pro-
vides an institutional setting that minimizes the frictions and
transactions costs of such procedures.
As the economist and environmental philosopher Kenneth
Boulding frequently emphasized, the market is a voluntary "ex-
change system" that is a "positive-sum-game in which all parties
can be better off," while politics is a "threat system" focussed on
redistribution. 21 8 Relying on the use of coercive powers, politics is
too likely to yield the gridlock and polarization that have
plagued the public rangelands for years. Attempts by the govern-
ment to impose solutions on people who do not regard them as
legitimate will generate bitterness and resentment. In contrast, a
market exchange system provides a set of arrangements that are
reached by mutual consent among the affected parties. Such a
decentralized process, freed from the tight constraints of bureau-
cratic management, will give birth to a host of innovative meth-
ods and approaches to the federal rangelands and forests of the
West.
Although he was not a libertarian himself, Boulding looked
with favor on an "economic libertarianism [that] quite rightly
emphasizes the benevolent and developmental qualities of ex-
change." 2 9 As I have argued, this outlook is moving past the
state of philosophical discussions and making some significant in-
roads among key groups in the federal land policy debate, offer-
216. See NELSON, REACHING FOR HEAVEN, supra note 1, at 257-332.
217. See Robert H. Nelson, Government as Theatre: Toward a New Par-
adigm for the Public Lands 65 U. COLO. L. REv. 335 (1994).
218. KENNETH E. BOULDING, BEYOND ECONOMICS: ESSAYS ON SOCIETY,
RELIGION, AND ETHics 103-105 (1968).
219. Id. at 44.
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ing the intriguing prospect of a confluence in certain areas of
libertarian and environmental theorizing and activism.
CONCLUSION
If forage rights were defined and made legally transferable to
any new owner, environmental organizations could purchase the
forage rights to federal lands that are now available only to
ranchers. Environmental groups seeking to reduce livestock graz-
ing on federal lands would have a realistic way to accomplish
their goals, other than by seeking to influence the exercise of
government commands-and-controls. A clear delineation of rights
would also encourage existing ranchers to invest in long-run im-
provement and productivity of the federal rangeland. Equally im-
portant, the debate over western land use would no longer be re-
solved by government regulators and planners, but by the
competitive workings of the marketplace. Changes in rangeland
use would be made through voluntary transactions among ex-
isting rights holders and those who wish to see future changes in
the federal lands use.
